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BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS IN INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW: 
BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND THE CHOICE OF 
RESERVATION LIST MODALITY 
Tae Jung Park* 
The RCEP (“Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership”) is viewed as an alternative to 
the TPP (“Trans-Pacific Partnership”) agreement, which included the United States but 
excluded China. The RCEP was launched in November 2012, but failed to conclude in 
2015, the original agreed-upon deadline. The investment chapter working group contributed to 
this delay. For the last four years, the member states have failed to agree on any of the terms in 
the investment agreement, instead debating over the modality of the reservation list of the main 
text. This reservation list is structured as either a positive or a negative list, however the two 
frameworks should yield the same legal consequences in principle. So why do member states have 
different preferences regarding the modality of the reservation list? This article employs 
behavioral economics to explain why member countries have different preferences regarding the 
framework.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
(“RCEP”)1 is a proposed free trade agreement (“FTA”) between the 
ten member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(“ASEAN”) (Brunei, Burma (Myanmar), Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam) and the 
six states with which ASEAN has existing FTA’s (Australia, China, 
India, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand). The RCEP 
negotiations were formally launched in November 2012 at the 
ASEAN Summit in Cambodia, and the 10th round of negotiations 
ended in South Korea around early October 2015. 
RCEP members originally agreed to conclude all the 
negotiations by the end of 2015, but they failed to do so. As of May 
2017, they are still in the process of negotiating. Among the many 
working groups involved in the negotiations, the investment working 
group has showed the slowest progress; its members simply debating 
over the framework that should be chosen for listing the reservations 
of the investment treaty. That is, for the last four years, they have 
done nothing but debate the framework of the reservation list2 and 
have agreed on nothing in text. 
This raises the question of why host nations (i.e. countries 
inviting and receiving foreign investment) pay so much attention to 
the framework of the reservation list? They probably do so because 
the reservation list is the most realistic and practical instrument that a 
                                                 
1 Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, DEPARTMENT OF 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE (2017), http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/ 
rcep/pages/regional-comprehensive-economic-partnership.aspx (last visited May 
23, 2017). 
2 There are two approaches for preparing a reservation list. One is the 
negative list approach (“top-down” approach), which lists exceptions to the general 
obligation of the main text of a treaty; the other is the positive list approach 
(“bottom-up” approach or “GATS” approach), which lists the specific sectors to 
which the general obligation applies. An advantage of the positive list approach is 
that it gives a greater level of discretion over what to include and when. Politically 
sensitive industries can be kept outside the scope of the agreement. The negative 
list approach can automatically include new types of investment, while the positive 
list approach cannot. See Preserving flexibility in IIA’s: The Use of Reservation, 
UNCDAD series on International Investment Policies for Development, 2006. 
2017 Park 5:2 
401 
host nation can use to carve out regulatory power, given their 
tendency for less developed negotiation skills and unequal bargaining 
power. The host nations are usually developing nations which do not 
have a legal department sophisticated enough to fully analyze and 
examine the investment treaties. Moreoever, they lack training 
programs and human resources to competently negotiate the treaties.3 
The beauty of the International Investment Agreement 
(“IIA”) lies in the way it balances the regulatory power of host 
nations with investor protection. The host nations do their utmost to 
carve out maximum domestic sovereignty, and home nations do their 
best to protect their investors.4 
                                                 
3 Zeng Huaqun, Balance, Sustainable Development, and Integration: Innovative 
Path for BIT Practice, 17 J. INT’L ECON. L, 299, 302-304 (2014) (explains that BIT 
gives home states a negotiating advantage since the party who drafts the model 
controls the negotiation. On the contrary, most of the host nations are suffering 
from unequal bargaining power and low negotiation skills in a negotiation because 
they have not prepared model BITs. Therefore, their position is merely accepting 
or slightly modifying to a model BIT prepared by home states’ negotiating partner. 
Only a few host states have prepared their model BITs and these are heavily 
influenced by the model BIT of home nations); see also M. Sornarajah, The 
International Law on Foreign Investment, 207-208 (Cambridge University Press, 
2004)(the book points out that it is hard to expect host nations to have a legal 
department sophisticated enough to understand and analyze the nuances in the 
variations of the terms used in IIA). 
4 See e.g. Suzanne A. Spears, The Quest for Policy Space in a New Generation of 
International Investment Agreements 13 J. INT’L ECON. L, 1037, 1071 (2010)(Argues that 
general exceptions clauses and new preambular language provide flexibility. The 
article classifies three types of general exceptions clauses found in IIA’s. The new 
preambular languages could include some non-investment policy objectives such as 
labor or environment protection.); Zeng Huaqun, Balance, Sustainable Development, 
and Integration: Innovative Path for BIT Practice, 17 J. INT’L ECON. L, 299, 324 (2014) 
(Classifies three types of goals- 1) balance 2) sustainable development 3) 
integration- that IIA’s should pursue. The article introduces the idea that the 
Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development (hereinafter “IPFSD”) 
emphasizes the insertion of “special and differential treatment (SDT)”. It pointed 
out that SDT provisions could be an option where a negotiating party to an IIA has 
significantly different levels of development, especially when one of the parties is a 
less developed country); Joshua Boone, How Countries Can Adapt Current Bilateral 
Investment Treaties to Provide Benefits to Their Domestic Economies 187 GLOBAL BUS. L. 
REV.187, 196-7 (2011) (explains the importance of modifying the Performance-
Based Requirement provisions. The article notes that Performance-based 
requirements such as technology transfers or limitations to technology licensing 
2017 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 5:2 
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However, there has been much criticism that many IIA’s 
which are being ratified are biased towards investor protection. The 
claim is that these ratified IIA’s are being drafted in favor of 
protecting investors rather than securing policy spaces in the host 
nations. This is due to home nations negotiating based on their 
model bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”), aiming for a high level 
of market opening and liberalization.5 They try their best to persuade 
host nations not to deviate from any terms in the Model BIT, and ask 
them to carve out as little as possible. The host nations lack the 
bargaining power and negotiation skills necessary to modify the 
Model BIT and, thus, accept most of the terms therein. It is well 
                                                 
fees are probably the most powerful regulation methods for host nations. These 
help to establish new markets, increase efficiency and production within new 
domestic markets because they allow for the host nation to use, acquire, produce 
and adapt the foreign technology. All these can be done by not prohibiting 
performance based requirements through modifying IIA); Markus Wagner, 
Regulatory Space in International Trade Law and International Investment Law 36 U. PA. J. 
INT’L L. 3, 35-53 (2014) (The article compares the WTO dispute settlement system 
in cases concerning human, animal or plant life, or health protection with 
international investment regimes. The article suggests that international trade and 
investment law can offer insights for one another. While international trade has 
been more adept at incorporating health or environmental concerns, changes in 
IIA’s should close the gap. Particularly, the article argues that such policy space 
over health and environmental issues could be done through a provision of 
expropriation in IIA). 
5 Lei Cai, Where does China Stand: The Evolving National Treatment Standard in 
BITs? 13 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE, 373 384  (2012)(addresses how host 
nations merely accept the terms in the Model BITs due to their low bargaining 
power. “Based on Guzman’s “prisoner’s dilemma” theory, the host nations 
compete with each other to attract foreign investment. As a result, they are 
frequently at a disadvantaged position with poor bargaining power in the 
negotiation process and thereby compelled to accept the model BIT proposed by 
the home states”); Amit M. Sachdeva, International Investment: A Developing Country 
Perspective 8 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 533, 547 (2007)(Argues that IIA’s 
result in a substantial reduction in regulatory power in host nations. The article 
points out that well regulated national policy is what they actually needed. Neo 
liberalism policy through IIA leads a reduction of infant indigenous industry and all 
of these issues are difficult to overcome by host nations because of their low 
bargaining power in IIA negotiation). 
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known that most ratified IIA’s are extremely similar in appearance, 
and almost identical to the terms in the model BIT.6 
On this basis, host nations believe that the reservation list 
framework is a practical and realistic solution to carve out and 
protect their regulatory powers.  Host nations devote meticulous care 
to negotiating a reservation list,7 rather than the main text. In 
particular, their concerns focus on the framework or modality of the 
reservation list. 
The framework is either a positive,8 or negative list.9 A 
positive list inserts domestic measures that conform to the main 
obligations of the treaty, while a negative list inserts non-conforming 
measures (i.e. exceptions to the main text), with all other unlisted 
measures automatically following the obligations of the main text. In 
principle, these two frameworks should yield the same legal 
consequences.   
                                                 
6 Huaqun, Supra note 3 at 324 (explains that most BITs follow either the 
Draft International Convention on Investments Abroad or OECD 1967 Draft 
Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property. Because of the common 
origins, the terms used in BITs look remarkably similar across countries. This 
similarity is due to the ‘innate’ priority of home nations and also reflects the 
historically weak and passive positions of host nations as contracting parties in 
IIA’s); see also Jason Webb Yackee, Conceptual Difficulties in the Empirical Study of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties 33 BROOKLYN J. INT’L. L. 405, 415-416 (2008) (explains 
that home nations have long been preoccupied with persuading host nations to 
provide certain treatments such as MFN, National Treatment, Fair and Equitable 
Treatment, which all yield a high level of liberalization). 
7 IIA’s consist of two parts: the main text and the reservation list. While 
the main text in the IIA’s determine the overall obligations (and rights) of both 
parties, the reservation list includes either conforming measures to the obligation of 
the main text (positive list) or non-conforming measures (negative list). 
8 A positive list approach means the positive listing of sectors, sub-
sectors and individual modes of supply in which countries voluntarily undertake 
liberalization commitments. The selective nature of liberalization under this 
approach implies that the treaties’ obligations apply only to the activities listed in a 
country’s schedule and solely on the terms described therein. 
9 Under the negative list, countries agree on a set of obligations in the 
main text and list all domestic measures for which such obligations do not apply. 
That is, the measures that do not appear in reservation lists are automatically under 
the effect of obligations in the main treaty text. Thus, this approach is most 
appropriate in countries aiming for a high degree of liberalization. 
2017 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 5:2 
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To address why this is so, this article employs a behavioral 
approach. This article seeks to answer the question of why 
negotiators have different preferences regarding the two frameworks. 
Fortunately, a few scholars have taken initial steps in determining the 
methodological foundations of behavioral international law and 
economics,10 and thus have examined how behavioral law and 
economics can be applied to international law.11 
Using the theoretical foundation of behavioral international 
law and economics, this article primarily argues that host nations 
strongly prefer a positive list over a negative list as they know that 
they have limited cognitive capacities to fully collect and analyze the 
existing domestic measures and determine which ones to carve out. 
Simply put, they know they are suffering from bounded rationalityin 
                                                 
10 Anne van Aaken, Behavioral International Law and Economics 55 HARV. 
INT’L L. J. 421,421-481 (2014); Tomer Broude, Behavioral International Law, 163 U. 
PENN. L. REV. 1099, 1099-1056 (2015). 
11 In fact, the rational choice approach to international law has been 
widely accepted and the rational approach was recently applied to the field of 
international investment law. However, while the rational choice paradigm has been 
thoroughly challenged in the field of economics since the 1970’s and has changed a 
significant part of economics, challenges to the rational choice paradigm have not 
been systematically explored in the field of international law. . The literature of 
international law never responded to this challenges of the rational choice and thus, 
there is no systematic analysis of international law using behavioral economics. For 
more references in applying rational choice to the field of international law. See 
generally Robert E. Scott & Paul Stephan, The Limits of Leviathan: Contract Theory 
and the Enforcement of International law (2006); Joel P. Trachtman, The 
Economic Structure of International Law(2008); Eric Posner & Alan O. Sykes, 
Economic Foundations of International law(2013), Andrew Guzman, How 
International Law works: A Rational Choice Theory(2008); For more reference in 
applying rational choice to the field of international investment law, See Anne van 
Aaken, International Investment Law Between Commitment and Flexibility: A Contract 
Theory 12 J. INT’L ECON. L. 507, 507 (2009) (argues that Contract theory could be 
utilized in IIA’s. The author points out that Contract theory has been applied to 
international trade law, but investment law has not yet been applied to IIA’s. IIA’s 
may be regarded as a mechanism for overcoming commitment problems between 
investors and host nations for mutual and reciprocal benefits. Contract theory deals 
with the uncertainty problem and could solve this issue); For more references on 
the literature of behavioral economics, See generally, Nick Wilkinson & Matthias 
Klaes, An Introduction to Behavioral Economics (2012); Matthew Rabin, 
Psychology and Economics, 36 J. Econ. Lit. 11 (1998). 
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the drafting of the negative list.12  This article does not seek to 
present a normative argument regarding the framework that should 
be used in BITs, it simply seeks to indicate why negotiating partners 
show different preferences regarding frameworks, which in theory, 
yield the same legal consequences. In addition, the article does not 
pinpoint the types of bounded rationality from which the host 
nations are suffering, it merely argues that the negotiators are 
experiencing trouble processing the limited information available to 
maximize their profits by drafting the reservation list under the 
negative list. 
II. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
A.  Reservation Lists in IIA’s  
A positive approach means there is a positive listing of 
sectors, sub-sectors, and individual modes of supply in which 
countries voluntarily undertake liberalization commitments. The 
selective nature of liberalization under this approach implies that a 
treaty’s obligations apply only to the activities listed in a country’s 
schedule and solely to the terms described therein. 
Alternatively, negotiating partners may utilize a negative list 
approach. In this case, countries agree on a set of obligations in the 
main text and list all domestic measures for which such obligations 
do not apply. That is, the measures that do not appear in reservation 
lists are automatically subject to the obligations in the main treaty 
text. Thus, this approach is most appropriate for countries aiming for 
a high degree of liberalization. 
                                                 
12 Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 199 199 (2006); (Bounded rationality, an idea first introduced by 
Herbert Simon, refers to the obvious fact that human cognitive abilities are not 
infinite. We have limited computational skills and seriously flawed memories. 
People can respond sensibly to these failings; thus it might be said that people 
sometimes respond rationally to their own cognitive limitations, minimizing the 
sum of decision costs and error costs. To deal with our limited memories we make 
lists; to deal with our limited brain power and time we use mental shortcuts and 
rules of thumb; but even with these remedies, and in some cases because of these 
remedies, human behavior differs in systematic ways from that predicted by the 
standard economic model of unbounded rationality. Even when the use of mental 
shortcuts is rational, it can produce predictable mistakes). 
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In summary, in a positive list schedule, a party sets out the 
sectors it has agreed will be covered by the relevant rules in the main 
text and if a sector is not stated in the list, it is not subject to those 
rules. In a negative list schedule, a party sets out those sectors or 
measures that are not subject to the relevant rules in the main text 
and if a sector; activity; or measure is not listed, then it is 
automatically covered (unless it has been excluded in the text itself). 
In theory, both approaches yield the same result in terms of 
liberalization. 
 1. Positive List Approach  
This approach recognizes four “modes” of trading in 
services: across the border (e.g. the Internet); consumption abroad 
(e.g. tourism); establishing a commercial presence (foreign direct 
investment (“FDI”)); and temporary presence of a natural person to 
deliver a service. Governments can make different levels of 
commitment for each mode in relation to market access and national 
treatment rules. 
Sector or sub-
sector 
Limitations on 
market access 
Limitations on 
national treatment 
Additional 
commitments 
8. HEALTH-
RELATED 
SERVICES 
   
Hospital 
Services (9311) 
(1) None 
(2) None 
(3) Unbound 
(4) None 
(Registration and 
Certification) 
(1)None 
(2)None 
(3)None 
(4)None13 
 
 
  Different entries under numbers 1 to 4 indicate the approach 
the government is taking to each of the four “modes of supply‟ for 
each service. When a country does not wish to limit or restrict market 
                                                 
13 For a detailed explanation of drafting a positive list, see  
http://wtocentre.iift.ac.in/CBP/GENERAL%20PRINCIPLES%20&%20GUIDE
LINES%20ON%20SCHEDULING%20SERVICES%20COMMITMENTS.pdf 
(accessed May 23 2017). 
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access or national treatment in a sector or subsector in any of the 
four modes of supply, it uses the word “None”, which indicates that 
there are “no limitations.” So, for instance, in the chart above, a full 
commitment using “None” means the country cannot restrict access 
to its market of foreign suppliers who want to supply any aspect of 
hospital services (9311) through modes 1 and 2 by using any of the 
market access measures that are specifically prohibited. If a country 
decides to restrict market access through Mode 3, thereby protecting 
the hospital services market, the word “Unbound”, meaning no 
bound commitments, is used in the column to block FDI by foreign 
investors looking to establish a hospital business. 
If a country wants to commit to a sector, but only under 
certain circumstances or in a particular way, it needs to clearly spell 
out the limitations that it wants to maintain. For instance, if a country 
wanted to open the market only with respect to the registration and 
certification of the hospital services, it could stipulate that limitation 
in a column. In that way, foreign investors with temporary stay 
authority would have an opportunity to work in the area of 
registration and certification in hospitals. As noted above, the 
obligations of the main text apply to the measures that are listed in 
the column. If the country decided not to list the hospital services 
area, then the government would have no obligations to comply with 
the main text with respect to hospital services.   
 2. Negative List Approach  
Under the negative listing approach, the main features of the 
non-conforming measures must be specified in detail. These 
measures include the following elements: the economic sector in 
which the reservation is taken; the specific industry in which the 
reservation is taken; the activity covered by the reservation; the 
substantial or procedural obligation to which the reservation is taken 
(e.g. MFN or national treatment); and a description of the specific 
law, regulation, or other measure for which the reservation is taken. 
2017 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 5:2 
408 
The following is an example of a reservation list in the Korea-India 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (“CEPA”).14 
Sector Manufacture of Chemical 
Products  
Sub-Sector Manufacture of Biological 
Products  
Industry 
Classification 
KSIC 24212 Manufacture of 
Biological Products 
Type of Reservation Performance Requirements 
(Article 10.5) 
Reservation Measure Pharmaceutical Affairs Act 
(Law No. 8552, February. 29, 
2008), Article 42 
Enforcement Regulations of 
the Pharmaceutical Affairs Act 
(Ordinance of the Ministry of 
Health and Welfare No. 71, 
October. 16, 2008), Article 21  
Description A person who manufactures 
blood products must procure 
raw blood materials from a 
blood management body in 
Korea.15  
  The above example shows that Korea reserves the right not to 
comply with the investment treaty obligations regarding performance 
requirements with respect to Indian investors’ manufacturing 
chemical products in Korea. Because of this reservation, foreign 
manufacturers of blood products in Korea must procure raw blood 
materials from a blood management body in Korea, . 
                                                 
14 The Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (the CEPA) is 
a free trade agreement between India and South Korea. CEPA was signed on 
August 7, 2009. The signing ceremony took place in Seoul and the Agreement was 
signed by the Indian Commerce Minister, Sharma, and South Korean Commerce 
Minister, Kim Jong-Hoon. The negotiations took three-and-a-half years, with the 
first session being held in February 2006. The agreement was passed in the South 
Korean Parliament on 6 November 2009. Available at http://commerce. 
nic.in/trade/INDIA%20KOREA%20CEPA%202009.pdf (Last visited May 25, 
2017). 
15 Id. 
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The negative list may consist of several annexes and 
reservations for future measures.16 These may be listed in Annex II 
(reservations for future measures), in addition to the current domestic 
measures, which are usually listed in Annex I (reservations for 
existing measures). Annex II sets out the economic sector and the 
activities where new restrictive measures can be implemented in the 
future. For example, if a country believes that it may implement some 
laws within the steel industry in the future, they would list the sector, 
without having to provide any information about domestic measures 
in Annex II. 
B. Behavioral International Law and Economics  
Recent literature has reconciled international law with the 
field of behavioral economics to establish behavioral international 
law and economics (“BIntLE”). BIntLE is the study of “how states 
really behave.”17 It explains how behavioral assumptions may change 
the strategies of states and negotiators, as well as the outcomes of 
games. Some scholars employ three categories to explain the 
foundations of BIntLE: the economic analysis of international law, 
behavioral economics, and psychological approaches in international 
relations.18The scholars believe that the three areas can complement 
each other and reveal new insights into the behavior of actors in 
international law. For instance, behavioral economics can enrich the 
economic analysis of international law. 
                                                 
16 In addition to Annex I (Reservation for Existing Measures) and Annex 
II (Reservation for Future Measures), there are more annexes that can be drafted, 
as agreed by negotiating partners. For instance,  under NAFTA, Mexico has an 
Annex III (Activities reserved to the State) which reserves measures governing the 
regulations of activities reserved to the State as decreed in the Mexican 
Constitution (primarily in the oil and gas sector). The unique nature of Annex III is 
that it has no requirement to specify the exact nature of non-conforming measures 
maintained in sectors like Annex II. Another example is the Annex on Exceptions 
from MFN. This annex carves out a number of sectors from MFN treatment (as 
opposed to individual measures as per Annex I). Thus, this Annex gives greater 
flexibility of reservations, allowing host nations to secure whole industries (e.g. 
“steel”) without the level of specificity applied to Annex I. For more reference, see 
UNCDAD,  Supra note 2. 
17 Aaken, Supra note 9 at 439. 
18 Id. at 424. 
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Some caveats with respect to applying individual decision 
theory to international law should be discussed as a preliminary 
matter because generally, the actor in international law is assumed to 
be the state. 
The application of behavioral economics to international law 
depends on who the actor to be analyzed is. In other words, it is 
uncertain whether we could apply individual decision theory to the 
state and consider the factors in applying that theory to the 
international sphere. There is no clear answer to this problem in 
relevant literature since commentators are not sure who really acts in 
international law.19 Both international organizations and individuals 
contribute to the implementation of international law, but the direct 
applicability of individual decision-making is in question. Some argue 
that individual decision theory is directly applicable to international 
judges, arbitrators, and treaty negotiators since they are individuals.20 
However, others counter by saying that the behavior of elites in 
making decisions seems to be different from that of the normal 
population, where various types of biases are concerned. This is 
because elites tend to have higher levels of trust and cooperation 
skills.21 That is, the behavior of judges and treaty negotiators may 
differ from that of general participants in the experimental lab. 
The application of BIntLE to IIA’s is still at an early stage. 
Some analysts have begun research how the proliferation of IIA’s can 
be interpreted in the field of behavioral economics. They argue that 
host nations’ irrational decisions in signing IIA’s arise from their 
“over-optimism” that IIA’s will support their economic growth.22 
They want to believe that signing IIA’s will help attract FDI, which, 
in turn, will boost a country’s economy. However, once they face an 
                                                 
19 Id. at 441. 
20 Id. at 443. 
21 See Emily M. Hafner –Burton et al, The Cognition and the Political 
Psychology of Elite Decision Making, 11 PERSP. ON POL. 369 369 (2013) (Arguing that 
experienced policy elites differ from inexperienced subjects in how they make 
decisions, rooted in “sophistication,” a learned skill that is derived from experience 
and tends to be greater in elite than non-elite populations). 
22 Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulsen, Bounded Rationality and the Diffusion of 
Modern Investment Treaties, 58 INT’L STUD. Q. 1, 5 (2014) 
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investor-state dispute claim, they may realize that they made their 
decisions without any consideration of a cost-benefit analysis.23 
Historically, the literature for this subject has never touched 
on the application of the behavioral approach to the decision-making 
process of investment treaty negotiators. Investment treaty 
negotiators are imperfect, irrational human beings and behavioral 
economics would have many implications for the negotiations. This 
article is the first to raise the behavioral issue in the context of 
investment treaty negotiators. The following section will argue that 
the bounded rationality problem arises especially when host nations 
draft the reservation list in the form of a negative list. 
III. APPLYING THE BEHAVIORAL APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW  
This section illustrates why home and host nations have 
different preferences regarding the reservation list framework. The 
first part argues that host nations prefer the positive list to the 
negative list because they know that preparing the negative list will 
result in self-suffering due to the bounded rationality problem. The 
second part of this section examines various real world examples of 
how host nations end up with incomplete and defective negative lists, 
and their negative consequences when attracting investments. These 
consequences explain why host nations avoid the negative approach. 
A.   Bounded Rationality in the Choice of Reservation List 
Framework   
Bounded rationality, an idea introduced by Herbert Simon, 
refers to the finiteness of human cognitive abilities. People have 
limited computational skills and seriously flawed memories, but they 
can respond sensibly to these failings. Thus, it could be said that 
people sometimes respond rationally to their own cognitive 
limitations, minimizing the sum of decision costs and error costs. 
People deal with limited memories, they make lists, and to deal with 
                                                 
23 Id. at 12. 
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limited brainpower and time, they use mental shortcuts and rules of 
thumb.24 
The point of bounded rationality is not that people might 
decide differently if they have more information or different 
information, or decide differently with different items in the utility 
function. Rather, the point is that they would not be able to process 
all of the information even if they had it. Thus, if we are to predict 
people’s actions, it is not enough to know the amount or quality of 
available information, we must also know what the cognitive process 
entails for selecting information and choosing rules of thumb. 
There are various types of bounded rationality. For instance, 
the framing effect25 relates to situations where people favor option A 
when a question or problem is posed in one way but favor option B 
when the same problem is posed in a different way. The endowment 
effect26 is another example of bounded rationality which leads 
                                                 
24 Jolls & Sunstein,  Supra note 12, 199. 
25 The framing effect is an example of cognitive bias in which people 
react to a particular choice in different ways depending on how it is presented; e.g. 
as a loss or as a gain. People tend to avoid risk when a positive frame is presented 
but seek risks when a negative frame is presented. Gain and loss are defined in the 
scenario as descriptions of outcomes (e.g. lives lost or saved, disease patients 
treated and not treated, lives saved and lost during accidents, etc.). See e.g. Tversky 
et al. The Causes of Preference Reversal, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 358-361 (1990); Wansink et 
al. Mindless Eating and Healthy Heuristics for the Irrational, 99 AM. ECON. REV 165-9 
(2009)(argues that people’s eating habits including quantity consumed, can be 
affected by the size of plates, packages or serving bowl used); Amos Tversky & 
Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 
453, 455 (1981); Daniel Kahneman, A Perspective on Judgment and Choice: Mapping 
Bounded Rationality  58 AM. PSYCHOL. 697, 703 (2003). 
26 In a traditional sense, the endowment effect is described as one’s 
preference to place a higher value on objects one owns relative to objects one does 
not own. This is evidenced by the experiment of Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler. 
In other words, willingness to accept (“WTA”) as a seller is higher than willingness 
to pay (“WTP”) as a buyer. Many researchers have conducted experiments that 
support this finding using different goods such as wine, chocolates, and basketball 
tickets. The most common explanation for the endowment effect is loss aversion. 
Simply put, a disutility from losing something is greater than the utility from 
acquiring that same thing; therefore WTA is higher than WTP. See generally  
Kahneman, D. et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem 
98 J. Pol. Econ. 1325,1325-1348 (1990); For reference on experiment with wine, See 
Van Dijk, E., & Van Knippenberg, D., Trading Wine: On the Endowment Effect, Loss 
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individuals to value goods differently depending on whether or not 
they possess them. If they already possess the goods, the individuals 
value them higher than they would if they were not in their 
possession. In other words, the people who have the goods at their 
disposal show greater willingness to pay for them than the people 
who do not have them at their disposal. 
The “status quo bias” explains that individuals tend not to 
deviate from their original positions. Depending on how the default 
is set, people make different choices because they simply have a 
tendency to not change their decisions.27 Organ donation, for 
instance, can be set up on an opt-in (no donation by default) or an 
opt-out (donation by default) basis. For example, an empirical study 
has shown that an opt-in default leads to fewer individuals making 
donations than an opt-out design.28 Last but not least, “over-
optimism”29 shows that people are, on average, overconfident about 
their future and about their predictions for their future. This relates 
not only to their own situations and capacities, but also to their 
evaluations of their control over a given situation. 
Host nations are well aware of their limited capacity to fully 
analyze domestic measures and prepare the optimal reservation list in 
the form of a negative list. In order to prepare a negative list, they 
should have the full capacity to examine all existing domestic 
measures in their nations and precisely determine which measures to 
                                                 
Aversion, and the Comparability of Consumer Goods 19 J. Econ. Psychol. 579, 579-597 
(2009); For reference on experiment with chocolate, See Knetsch J.L., The 
Endowment Effects and Evidence of Nonreversible Indifference Curves 79 Am. Econ. Rev. 
1277, 1277-1284 (1989); For reference on experiment with basketball tickets, See 
Carmon, Z. & Ariely, D., Focusing on the Forgone: Why Value Can Appear so Different to 
Buyers and Sellers, 27 J. Consumer Res. 360, 360-370 (2000). 
27 Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions 
About Health, Wealth, and Happiness (2008). 
28  Eric J. Johnson & Daniel Goldstein, Do Defaults Save Lives? 302 SCI. 
1338, 1338 (2003). 
29  See generally Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism about Future Life 
Events, 39 J. PERS. SOC. PSYCHOL. 806 806 (1980) For more detail on studies of 
excess optimism, see Marie Helweg-Larsen & James A. Shepperd,  Do Moderators of 
the Optimistic Bias Affect Personal or Target Risk Estimates? A Review of the Literature,  5 
PERS. SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 74 74 (2001). 
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list. In principle, under the rational choice model,30 rational 
negotiators would easily achieve this maximized result. With their 
infinite cognitive ability, the rational negotiators would analyze all the 
data and information regarding the domestic measures perfectly, and 
distinguish the non-conforming measures without error. They could 
produce an optimal reservation list by perfectly examining the 
domestic measures without any errors and figure out which one 
should be carved out from the present IIA. This optimal reservation 
list would maximize the gains of host nations and indicate to foreign 
investors exactly which measures had been carved out from the 
treaty. The imposition of carve-outs and specificities on the 
reservation list would be optimal for attracting foreign investments. 
However, host nations know they cannot produce the 
optimal reservation list under the negative approach. They fully 
recognize the variety of cognitive problems associated with 
processing the data and information. They know they have 
insufficient information available to create an optimal reservation list 
that would maximize domestic profits. The limited access of host 
nations to resources makes it difficult to collect all of the required 
data and fully predict what measures should be carved-out from the 
main text. For example, host nations may face extreme difficulties in 
obtaining cooperation from other line ministries.31 Of course, there 
                                                 
30 The research of applying rational choice perspective under Contract 
theory to International law is accelerating. A classic definition of rationality by Gary 
Becker: “All human behavior can be viewed as involving participants who 
maximize their utility from a stable set of preferences and accumulate an optimal 
amount of information and other inputs in a variety of markets”. The central 
principles of Rationality are thus, utility maximization, stable preferences, rational 
expectations and optimal processing of information. Applying Rational choice to 
international law is basically transferring these principles to collective actors such as 
states or international organizations. It is assumed that potential biases cancel each 
other out on the aggregate level or do not even occur within corporate actors) See 
generally Kenneth Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for 
International Lawyers (1989) 14 YALE J. INT L L. 335, 348-54 (discussing 
methodology in international relations theory that is relevant for this paper); Jeffrey 
L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of International Law (1999) 24 
YALE J. INT’L L. 1 ; Jack L. GoldSmith & Eric A. Posner, The limits of 
International law (2005); Anne van Aaken, To Do Away with International Law? Some 
Limits to ‘The Limits of International Law’ 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 289 (2016). 
31 People debate whether trade representatives should be placed under 
the Ministry of trade (or foreign affairs) or a part of the executive office of the 
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are exceptions when the negotiation team has strong political power 
and is prioritized, such as the United States Trade Representative 
(“USTR”),32 which is a part of the Executive Branch of the United 
States Government. However, almost all negotiators from host 
nations experience difficulties in cooperating with line ministries, 
especially with respect to collecting measures for the preparation of a 
reservation list. For instance, a negotiation team under a Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs or Trade may send a request to the Ministry of Land 
to prepare a reservation list, with respect to land measures, because it 
has no expertise in this area. However, in many cases, the Ministry of 
Land frequently postpones submitting the reservation list to the 
negotiation team because it is simply not one of its principal 
functions. Thus, even if the domestic measures are easily obtainable 
by line ministries, the administrative inefficiencies and lack of 
cooperation between ministries may become big hurdles to listing the 
measures in the reservation list. 
Because of their incapacity to fully analyze and prepare the 
reservation list, negotiators frequently fail to insert the reserving 
sector that they would otherwise have to insert in the reservation list. 
They sometimes leave blank the domestic measures section of the 
reserving sector or stipulate unspecified domestic measures such as a 
law without specific article numbers. 
                                                 
President. Many suggest host developing countries conduct structure reform of the 
trade representative so that it becomes an independent entity under the executive 
office of the President see e.g. Kim, supra note 20, at 69 (argues that Korea’s 
current negotiation agency under Ministry of Trade lacks: the mechanism through 
which the opinions of the interested-party are transmitted to the agency; the 
mechanism of checks and balances between the parliament and the agency; the lack 
of a horizontal decision-making process. The article ultimately argues that Korea’s 
negotiation agency should follow the US model and establish a Korea trade 
representative). 
32 The USTR is the United States Government agency responsible for 
developing and recommending United States trade policy to the President of the 
United States, conducting trade negotiations on bilateral and multilateral levels, and 
coordinating trade policy within the Government through the interagency Trade 
Policy Staff Committee (TPSC) and Trade Policy Review Group (TPRG). 
Established as the Office of the Special Trade Representative (STR) under the 
Trade Expansion Act of 1962, the USTR is part of the Executive Office of the 
President. With over 200 employees, the USTR has offices in Geneva, Switzerland, 
and Brussels, Belgium. The current U.S. Trade Representative is Michael Froman, 
who assumed the office on June 21, 2013.  
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These incomplete reservation lists represent a significant loss 
for host nations. The unlisted measures may be critical policy 
measures that should have been carved-out. The unspecified 
measures or blanks in the reservation lists make it difficult for foreign 
investors to draw permissible boundaries for their investments, which 
can reduce transparency and predictability for foreign investments. 
In short, host nations are fully aware of their limited capacity 
to conclude a benefit-maximizing reservation list in the form of the 
negative list. They also recognize the negative consequences 
associated with an incomplete and defective reservation list in the 
form of the negative list. 
In this regard, the positive list is less burdensome because 
host nations do not face any significant pressure in the analysis of 
their measures. If they fail to find a measure, the missed measure 
does not have to comply with the highly liberalized main text. Thus, 
it avoids a high level of liberalizations. There are also no unspecified 
or blank measures in the positive list since the positive list does not 
require the parties to specify the domestic measures. The positive list 
mainly requires the parties to stipulate whether they will open or 
close the market in a certain sector. 
By contrast, home nations strongly prefer the negative list 
because they believe the benefits of such outweigh its costs. Home 
nations expect host nations to open more markets in various sectors 
of the economy so that their foreign investors can make informed 
investment decisions. Knowing that the host nations will fail to 
include many economic sectors in the reservation obligations list of 
the highly liberalized text, home nations will automatically bind all of 
those sectors. They expect all unexamined sectors or measures to 
conform to a main text that aims for high liberalization and market 
openings. 
For instance, if a host nation forgets to list a biotechnology 
sector, this is clearly an advantage for the relevant home nations 
involved because they know that the sector will automatically 
conform to the main text of the treaty, thus achieving high 
liberalization and market openings in the host nations. Of course, the 
negative list has a downside for home nations being that the 
incomplete and defective domestic measures may potentially confuse 
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the investors. For example, if host nations successfully insert the 
biotechnology sector in the negative list, but fail to put the domestic 
measures of the biotechnology sector in the reservation list, foreign 
investors have difficulty finding out which exact local rules have been 
carved-out. However, home nations generally believe that this is a 
minor cost because they anticipate additional benefits from 
unexpected market openings within different sectors of the economy, 
which the host nations failed to take into account. Moreover, home 
nations believe that, to a certain extent, inserting a renegotiation 
clause could cure the incomplete and defective domestic measures in 
the reservation list. In fact, the home nations frequently include the 
renegotiation clause for the host nations to specify and update the 
reservation list.33 
In this respect, home nations do not prefer the positive list 
because their unlisted measures do not have to conform with the 
main text of the relevant treaty. Home nations can no longer 
anticipate the unexpected market opening from host nations’ failure 
to carve-out certain terms that they would get under a negative list 
approach. 
So far, this article has concluded that host nations prefer the 
positive list and avoid selecting the negative list because they suffer 
from the bounded rationality problem, which makes it difficult to 
examine and identify local domestic measures. 
B. Issues with the Negative List – The Incomplete Reservation List  
This section illustrates host nations’ poor drafting tendencies 
with reservation lists and the negative consequences of such, which 
                                                 
33 e.g. Trilateral Investment Agreement between ASEAN, Australia, and 
New Zealand: 
Article 16 Work Program 
1. The Parties shall enter into discussions of 
(a)  schedules of reservations to this Chapter; a 
(b)  treatment of investment in services which does not qualify as commercial 
presence in Chapter 8 (Tradein Services). See also Japan-India Economic 
Partnership Agreement:Article 90.  Reservation and Exceptions. 5. Each Party shall 
endeavour, where appropriate, to reduce or eliminate the exceptions specified in its 
Schedules in Annexes 8 and 9 respectively. 
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in turn, explains why they prefer the positive list. The article will 
classify two types of incomplete reservation lists. 
The first is the missing measures problem which comes in 
two forms, and involves a failure to insert domestic measures. One 
way this may occur is through a host nation’s failure to carve out the 
economic sector itself, for instance, land acquisitions, so the number 
of reservations is less than intended. When this is the case, the host 
nation has no way to insert domestic measures with respect to land 
measures. The other way this occurs is when, even if they do 
successfully carve out a sector, host nations fail to insert domestic 
measures in the reservation list. That is, the domestic measures 
section of the reservation list is left blank. This type of incomplete 
reservation list is the unspecified measures problem. This is the case 
when host nations successfully carve out the economic sector and 
even insert the domestic measures, but the measures are not clear or 
specific enough to draw a clear boundary for permissible 
investments. 
The third type of incomplete reservation list arises from the 
failure to continuously update treaties and their text to reflect any 
amendments. Even if host nations successfully carve out the sector 
and specify the measures, they frequently fail to reflect the 
specifications in the later treaty. This section illustrates these three 
types of problems through examples of IIA’s that demonstrate how 
incomplete reservation lists negatively impact host nations’ ability to 
attract foreign investment. Consequently, this illustration is best 
understood by considering why host nations avoid the negative list. 
 1.  Missing Measures 
The missing measures problem is the predominant reason 
why host nations choose to avoid using the negative list. The 
problem appears when countries leave a blank space in the domestic 
measures section for the reserved sector. The following is an example 
of missing measures in the Singapore-New Zealand Closer Economic 
Partnership (“CEP”): 
Sector:                 Printing & Publishing 
Manufacture & Repair of 
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Transport Equipment 
Power/Energy                                        
Types of Limitation:    National treatment (Article 
29) 
Legal Citation:  
Description:           More favourable treatment 
may be accorded to Singapore 
nationals and the permanent 
residents in the above 
sectors.34                      
  In this reservation list, Singapore tried to carve-out regulatory 
power in the area of Printing & Publishing, Manufacture & Repair of 
Transport, and Equipment Power/Energy. However, a legal citation 
section is missing indicating that Singapore failed to insert the 
domestic laws that reflect the reservation, creating many problems. 
For one, its absence reduces transparency and predictability for 
foreign investors, especially when these investors have no idea what 
domestic measures they should look at before making an investment. 
Also, the legal consequences of the missing measures are not clear. 
Suppose Act A is the law that should be inserted in the above 
reservation list. Should this Act A be covered by the main text? The 
answer is unclear. One may even argue that Act A is not carved-out 
because it was not listed in the reservation list, so it should therefore 
conform with the main text. All these uncertainties make it difficult 
for host nations to attract foreign investment. 
 2. Unspecified Measures  
Host nations sometimes insert domestic measures that are 
not clear or specific enough. For example in the CEP Singapore 
                                                 
34 The CEP entered into force on 1 January 2001. It is the most 
comprehensive trading agreement, outside of the Closer Economic Relations with 
Australia, that New Zealand has negotiated. The CEP aims to build on the close 
historical ties between Singapore and New Zealand by improving opportunities for 
trade in goods, services and investment. The two governments announced their 
intention to negotiate an agreement in September 1999 and negotiations were 
completed within one year. 
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carved out their Companies Act with respect to the establishment, 
reporting, and filing of accounts. However, the legal citation is not 
clear as the article numbers are missing: 
     In the present example, the unspecified measures may 
have a negative effect for the Governments of both Singapore and 
New Zealand. For example the unspecified measures reduce 
transparency and predictability for investors from New Zealand, the 
main readers of the reservation lists, and thus, the Singapore 
Government may have difficulty attracting FDI from New Zealand.36 
New Zealand investors may have difficulty ascertaining legally 
permissible boundaries for investments in Singapore. The Companies 
Act of 1994 includes all sorts of laws and regulations about 
companies, which creates uncertainty in determining whether 
                                                 
35 Id. 
36 See generally UNCTAD, Transparency (UNCTAD Series on Issues in 
International Investment Agreements II) (Unite Nation 2012) (The report has a 
comprehensive analysis of how IIA could enhance transparency and predictability 
for investors. The report examines: the way in which traditional transparency issues 
have been addressed in IIA’s since 2004; the emergence of investor responsibilities 
as a consideration within transparency issues; and the introduction of a 
transparency dimension into investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). In analyzing 
these issues, this report outlines possible sustainable development implications of 
the different transparency-related formulations used in IIA’s and points to some of 
the most progressive provisions that are appearing more frequently in investment 
instruments. The report reviews transparency regarding investor conduct, 
transparency in ISDS, and other obligations that are related to transparency in 
IIA’s. This report does not address transparency relating to reservation lists. This 
article is the first piece to argue the ways to enhance transparency and predictability 
in IIAs) 
All Sectors  
Type of Limitation:  National treatment (Article 
29) 
Legal Citation:      Companies Act, Cap 
50(1994) 
Description:         Compliance by Foreign 
Companies with the 
Companies Act as in 
establishing, reporting and 
filing of accounts.35 
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Singapore only carved-out measures related to establishing, reporting, 
and filing of accounts. Thus, the question remains: Did the Singapore 
Government reserve the right to adopt all of the provisions in the 
Companies Act, or just the provisions relating to establishing, 
reporting, and filing accounts? 
IV. A HYBRID APPROACH AND A RENEGOTIATION CLAUSE 
As home and host nations display dramatic differences in 
their preferences for reservation list frameworks, it can sometimes be 
very difficult to reach a consensus. To resolve the conflict, both 
parties often conclude the treaty with a combined approach for 
reservation lists: negative and positive. The Australia-Chile FTA is a 
good example of such.37 The Agreement first grants market access 
for all investments, then adds a reservation list in the market access 
column. It is uncertain whether this complex structure really confers 
transparency to the measures, but its intent is to combine the best 
aspects of both frameworks. 
Another method involves simply deciding to renegotiate the 
reservation list when host nations have prepared their measures.38 
                                                 
37 The Australia–Chile FTA is a trade agreement between the countries 
of Chile and Australia. It was signed on July 30, 2008 and went into effect in the 1st 
quarter of 2009. The FTA is available at http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/ 
aclfta/pages/australia-chile-fta.aspx (accessed on Mar 6 2016). 
38 Some international agreements are renegotiated while others remain 
stable. Despite growing interest in agreement flexibility and design, the literature 
has not addressed this question in depth. Some provide a theoretical framework for 
explaining why some treaties contain limited duration and renegotiation provisions, 
while others are rigid. Others explore the more general question of why states 
design agreements with flexibility allowing obligations to be adjusted over time, 
temporarily or permanently. The issue of renegotiation in the field of IIA is still in 
an early stage. Some argue that the negotiating partners renegotiate when they have 
learned something new about the state of the world, for instance faced a investor-
state dispute settlement. That is, a direct experience with investment disputes, 
which reveals new information about the consequences of the IIA, is associated 
with a greater propensity to renegotiate. However, the literature has not examined 
in depth why nations renegotiate after the ratification of the treaty. See Koremenos, 
Barbara, Loosening the Ties that Bind: A Learning Model of Agreement Flexibility 55 INT’L 
ORG. 289 289-325 (2001); Koremenos, Barbara, Contracting around International 
Uncertainty, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 549, 549-565 (2005); Helfer, Lawrence R. 
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Singapore and New Zealand recognized the problems associated with 
unspecified measures in the reservation list, and as a result, put the 
following clause in the main text to renegotiate the narrowing-down 
of the measures: 
Article 32 Limitations 
2.  As part of the reviews of this Agreement provided 
for in Article 68, the Parties undertake to review at 
least every two years the status of the limitations set 
out in Annex 3 with a view to reducing the limitations 
or removing them. 
This allows Singapore to narrow-down the measures by 
specifying the relevant article numbers. If the stated measures do not 
reflect the “description,” then Singapore should reduce or eliminate 
such measures in the reservation list. 
The following is the renegotiation clause of the trilateral 
investment agreement between ASEAN, Australia, and New Zealand 
(“AANZFTA”). 
Article 16 Work Programme 
The Parties shall enter into discussions on: 
(a)  schedules of reservations to this Chapter; 
and..[…] 
3.  The Parties shall conclude the discussions referred 
to in Paragraphs 1 and 2 within five years from the 
date of entry into force of this Agreement unless the 
Parties otherwise agree. These discussions shall be 
                                                 
Flexibility Mechanism in International Agreements in International law and 
International Relations (Jeffrey Dunoff &Mark A. Pollack eds., 2012); Kal 
Raustiala, Form and Substance in International Agreement, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 581,581-
614 (2005); Yoram Z. Haftel & Alexander Thompson, When Do States Renegotiate 
International Agreements? The Case of Bilateral Investment Treaties (Univ. Of Maryland 
Presentation Working paper, 2013). 
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overseen by the Investment Committee established 
pursuant to Article 17 (Committee on Investment). 39 
As can be seen above, this is a different renegotiation clause 
from the one found in the CEP in the sense that the three parties 
signed the treaty without including a reservation list. Australia and 
New Zealand successfully persuaded the 10 ASEAN host nations to 
choose the negative list, but they all agreed to draft the list after the 
ratification of the Treaty. Paragraph 2 states that the three parties 
decided to start drafting and to conclude the negotiations on the 
reservation list within five years of the ratification of the Treaty. 
V. CONCLUSION  
In reality, host nation negotiators are not rational agents 
because they are just normal human beings. 40 They do not have 
sufficient cognitive capacity to accurately examine the measures and 
determine which domestic measures should be protected from the 
highly liberalized text of a treaty. Because of this, host nations 
frequently fail to put domestic measures that should otherwise be 
inserted in the negative reservation list. They sometimes fail to insert 
the name of a certain domestic measure in the reservation list and 
frequently insert unspecified domestic measures (i.e. domestic laws 
without article numbering). 
Host nations are fully aware that these incomplete and 
defective lists, which fall under the negative approach, will have 
                                                 
39 The AANZFTA was executed on 27 February 2009 and entered into 
force on:1 January 2010 – Brunei, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, 
Vietnam, Australia and New Zealand;12 March 2010 – Thailand;1 January 2011 – 
Laos; 4 January 2011 – Cambodia; and 10 January 2012 – Indonesia. (accessed on 
Mar 6 2016, at http://www.thaifta.com/engfta/Home/FTAbyCountry/tabid/ 
53/ctl/detail/id/75/mid/480/usemastercontainer/true/Default.aspx ). 
40 Herbert Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q. J. ECON. 99, 
99 (1955) (argues that individuals do not seek to maximize their benefit from a 
particular course of action because they have no capacity to digest all the 
information that would be needed to do such a thing. They do not have the 
capacity to access all the information required and even if they did, their mind 
would not be able to process it properly). 
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negative consequences. This awareness leads the parties to have 
different preferences over the modality of the framework of the 
reservation list. 
This article is merely the beginning of the efforts to apply the 
behavioral approach to international investment law. This article 
examined the issues from the perspective of the bounded rationality, 
however  there are many other issues in the international law regime 
that can be described from the behavioral economics viewpoint. For 
instance, bounded self-interest may explain the existence of a 
question and answer session during the negotiation phase.41 This 
would involve the negotiators from the home nations giving the 
negotiators from the host nations brief lectures about the terms of 
international investment agreements and answering the questions of 
the host nations’ representatives. Why would negotiating partners 
cooperate each other, instead of compete each other? Why are the 
developed countries so altruistic that they would give a lecture to the 
host developing countries? This may be able to be explained from the 
perspective of bounded self-interest. More research should be done 
in reconciling behavioral economics with international investment 
law and international law in general. 
 
                                                 
41 Surprisingly, for most of the readers of this article, negotiators with 
expertise from home nations frequently hold question and answer (Q & A) sessions 
parallel to main investment negotiations in order to facilitate the negotiation. 
Apparently, this shows a dramatic inequality of bargaining power between 
negotiating parties. The Q&A sessions usually consist of discussions about the 
meanings of provisions or articles and the consequences of adopting them. The 
lecturers - negotiators from home nations- would have the maximum amount of 
bargaining power depending on how they shape their Q & A sessions. 
